Helicopteros and specific jurisdiction?

As we’ll discuss in class, in Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant Helicol’s conduct did not rise to the level where general jurisdiction was appropriate. But from the facts – and from Justice Brennan’s dissent – one may wonder why the Court refused to address specific jurisdiction.

Your casebook includes the Court’s conclusion that “All parties to the present case concede that respondents’ claims against Helicol did not ‘arise out of,’ and are not related to, Helicol’s activities within Texas.” (Emphasis added.) In dissent, Justice Brennan analyzed the issue anyway, arguing that even if the lawsuit did not “arise out of” defendant’s contacts, the suit was nonetheless “directly and significantly related to” the contacts, and that this would be enough for specific jurisdiction.

Did the parties actually “concede” that there was no specific jurisdiction? And does the majority express any opinion on whether – for purposes of specific jurisdiction – the suit need only “relate to” the defendant’s contacts rather than “arise out of” the contacts? Your analysis might be aided by the majority’s FN 10, omitted from the casebook. The FN appears at the end of the majority's "concede" conclusion quoted above (citations omitted):

10. See Brief for Respondents 14; Tr. of Oral Arg. 26-27, 30-31. Because the parties have not argued any relationship between the cause of action and Helicol’s contacts with the State of Texas, we, contrary to the dissent’s implication, assert no “view” with respect to that issue.

The dissent suggests that we have erred in drawing no distinction between controversies that “relate to” a defendant’s contacts with a forum and those that “arise out of” such contacts. This criticism is somewhat puzzling, for the dissent goes on to urge that, for purposes of determining the constitutional validity of an assertion of specific jurisdiction, there really should be no distinction between the two.

We do not address the validity or consequences of such a distinction because the issue has not been presented in this case. Respondents have made no argument that their cause of action either arose out of or is related to Helicol’s contacts with the State of Texas. Absent any briefing on the issue, we decline to reach the questions (1) whether the terms “arising out of” and “related to” describe different connections between a cause of action and a defendant’s contacts with a forum, and (2) what sort of tie between a cause of action and a defendant’s contacts with a forum is necessary to a determination that either connection exists. Nor do we reach the question whether, if the two types of relationship differ, a forum’s exercise of personal jurisdiction in a situation where the cause of action “relates to,” but does not “arise out of,” the defendant’s contacts with the forum should be analyzed as an assertion of specific jurisdiction.

After reading it, ask: does the majority mean that the plaintiffs expressly conceded that the suit did not “arise out of” or “relate to” Helicol’s activities? Or did the majority mean that the plaintiffs failed to raise the issue and in doing so waived any specific jurisdiction argument?

Also consider, if Justice Brennan is on to something, then how attenuated would a contact have to be before it is simply not a contact that would go to specific jurisdiction? Does Shaffer provide any guidance as to when a contact is too remote to be relevant to establishing specific jurisdiction?

Categories: Personal jurisdiction k-pj